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INTRODUCTION
Two o f Judaism's greatest philosophers were Philo of A le xan dria , also known as Philo Judaeus, and Saadia ben Joseph, o r Saadia Gaon.
A l though th e ir philosophic standpoints have much in common, th e re are d iffe re n ce s, too, th a t make a comparison of im port.
In o rd e r to p u t them in th e ir h is to ric c o n te xt, it must be mentioned that
Philo o f A lexandria (c. 20BCE-50CE), a proponent of H ellenistic Greek -115-philosophy, "is the only Jewish H ellenistic philosopher from whom a body of works has s u rv iv e d " (K atz, 1975:10) . F urtherm ore, he "g re a tly in fluenced the development of C h ristia n dogma" (M argolis & M arx, 1980:186; cf. Marcus, 1948:29) , w ith Eusebius, Jerome, Ju stin M a rty r, Clement of Alexandria and Ambrosius all being indebted to him (c f. B illin g s,
1979:1-3).
In a d d itio n , "h is general method of exegesis, many of its details, the determ ining prin cip le s of his religious philosophy, passed into the C h ristia n C hurch . . . " (Drummond, 1969:2) . On the o th e r hand, Saadia Gaon (882-942) can "be considered the fa th e r of medieval Jewish philosophy of re lig io n " (G uttm ann, 1973:69) . Guttman (1973:69) points o ut th a t Saadia was the f ir s t to develop the ideas of Islamic theology and philosophy inde pen de ntly, and was also the prim e pioneer in u n de rta king a system atic philosophical ju s tific a tio n o f Judaism.
Philo's w ritin g s deal mainly w ith the Pentateuch and can be d ivide d in to
th re e series of treatises (c f. Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971: XI11:410-411 ).
The f ir s t consists of an exposition of the Pentateuch as a legal code,
whereas the second is a philosophical in te rp re ta tio n of the Pentateuch, and the th ir d consists of questions and answers on Genesis and Exodus, being in the form of a H ellenistic commentary w ith each paragraph headed by an exegetic question and answered by a sh o rt lite ra l and a long allegorical explanation. Saadia's philosophic system as a whole is found in his Sefer ha-Em unot ve -h a -D e 'o t (T he book o f be lie fs and opinions) o rig in a lly w ritte n in A ra b ic; th is is the ea rlie st Jewish philosophic w ork from medieval times to have s u rv iv e d in ta c t (c f. Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971 : X IV : 548).
Like all w rite rs , n e ith e r philosopher was e n tire ly o rig in a l, b u t was in fluenced b y oth ers.
INFLUENCES
Although the various influences on these two philosophers w ill be pointed ou t th ro u g h o u t th is paper, it is a p p ro p ria te to mention the most im portant ones at th is stage.
Even though Philo is regarded by some scholars as an opponent of the stoics, the philosophical s u b s tru c tu re o f his w o rld view may be described -116-as "a stoicism w ith a stro n g Platonic bent and some neo-Pythagorean in* fluences" (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971: XI11:411) . U n til the middle of the sixteenth c e n tu ry , the C hurch Fathers tho u g h t o f Philo as a Greek p h i losopher and "b y the time of Herome, it had become a fix e d tra d itio n to regard Philo as a P latonist" (B illin g s , 1979:2) . In p a rtic u la r, the Platonic influences can be seen in his separation o f the w o rld in to a lower, ma te ria l, and a h ig h e r, s p iritu a l o r in te llig ib le , realm. Dillon (in Winston & D illo n, 1983:77) stresses th a t "P hilo o f A lexandria is dependent to at least some e xte n t on Greek ra th e r than tra d itio n a l Jewish models fo r the specific form of his allegorical exegesis o f the Pentateuch." To underline th is in flue nce, Runia (1983:19) contends tha t
Philo's debt to Plato is g re a te r than to any o th e r Greek philoso p h e r, b u t to a large exte nt his un derstanding of Plato's philosophy, it is now argued, is filte re d th ro u g h the scholastic tra d itio n s of Middle Platonism.
However, one must remember th a t as a Jew, Philo "n e v e r wavered in his lo y a lty " to "th e dom inating presence of the Mosaic le gislatio n" (Runia, 1983 :2).
Like Philo, Saadia was influenced by the stoics, Plato, neo-Platonists and also A ris to tle , b u t fo r his fundamental theses he was dependent on the Kalam, in c lin in g towards its ra tio n a list M u 'ta zilite school which was sim ilar to the Jewish position w ith regard to its belief in the concept of God's u n ity and in its follow ing the do ctrine of fre e w ill. However, as Guttmann A ccording to Cahn (1962:329) , the greatest influence on Saadia was the A rab philosopher Ibn al Rashid whose ideas Saadia incorporated in to Jewish ideology, b u t w ith the prim e aim of s tre n g th e n in g Jewish fa ith .
-117-
With th is as ba ckgro und , the various philosophic concepts o f Philo and Saadia w ill be discussed.
PHILOSOPHIC CONCEPTS

God
The influence of the tra d itio n a l Jewish idea of God can be found in Philo's stressin g of God's transcendence and s p iritu a lity .
In rejectin g stoic m aterialism and pantheism , he denies the concept of a personal God, albeit not co n siste n tly. He rejects anthropom orphic cha racteristics in discuss ing God, elevating him "above all values and perfections conceivable to the human m ind" (G uttm ann, 1973:27) . He contends th a t it is wrong to suppose th a t God feels any passion, as "d is q u ie t is peculiar to human weakness" and has no relation to God.
A ll the same the Law giver uses such expressions, ju s t so fa r as they serve fo r a kin d of elementary lesson, to admonish those who could not otherw ise be b ro u g h t to th e ir senses. (Philo, 1968:111:37) .
As only His bare existence can be comprehended by the in te lle c t, Philo p re fe rs to call God "He Who Is" o r even "B e in g ". This transcendentalism surpasses even th a t of Plato, w ith God transce nd ing v ir tu e , knowledge, the good and the b e a u tifu l:
God being uncreated and the A u th o r of the creation of the others needs none of the p ro pe rties which belong to the creatures which He has b ro u g h t in to being (P hilo, 1968:111:39) .
With regard to p ro v in g the existence of God, Philo adopts Plato's causal approach th a t fo r the w orld to e xist something must have b ro u g h t it in to being. Blau (1971:53) refers to Philo's c itin g of Isaiah 66:1 in which the pro ph et re p o rts God's saying, "T he heaven is my thron e and the earth is my fo o ts to o l." As both these objects must have a cause, God must be th a t and also d is tin c t from the heavens and e a rth . However, if e v e ry th in g had a cause, then something must have caused God, too, and one is faced w ith an In fin ite Regress.
-118-Philo trie s to overcome th is w ith the A ristote lia n argum ent of the o rigin al agent, o r Unmoved Mover being God. He also adopts the argum ent from design: as so much o rd e r exists in the w orld (such as the seasons), the re must be one who established the o rd e r, ju s t as if one sees a house, one must realise the re is an a rtific e r behind it : "We see then, th a t any piece of w ork always involves the knowledge of a workman" (Philo, 1968:V I1 :117) . Blau (1971:54-55) mentions another argument th a t Philo uses -th a t of in tro sp e ctio n : we can comprehend th a t a mind is in our body, even if d is tin c t and separate.
S im ilarly, the U niversal Mind which is in the universe is God. B u t, as Blau (1971:55) . . . since the C reator of all bodies cannot be of the same species as His cre a tu re s, and since the bodies are many in number, it follows of necessity th a t He be one. For if He were more than one, the re would apply to Him the category of number and He would fall under the laws go ve rn in g bodies (Saadia, 1948:96) .
-119-Saadia a ttrib u te s th re e essential qu alities to God: life , power and w is dom, to which u n ity and uniqueness should also be added, according to Guttmann (1973:77) . This does not im ply a p lu ra lity in God as these q u alities are united in Him; however, because of the shortcom ings of language, we have to speak of them as separate. The God of action, who is in tension w ith h is to ry and man, somehow blends in to a d ivin e in te llige nce , who does not rush to man's side b u t has man come to Him th ro u g h awareness and u n d e rsta nd ing .
Saadia (sic) seems not to have been tro u b le d b y any sense of in consistency; indeed, he was suprem ely co n fid e n t of his intellectual powers. God is s e lf-s u ffic ie n t. God's s e lf-s u ffic ie n c y proves th a t all God does is good, hence wise. God acts in h is to ry , listens to p ra y e rs , and perform s m iracles.
Philo, on th e o th e r hand, attem pts to overcome any possible c o n tra d iction s on th is level by his d o ctrin e of the Logos.
.2 Logos
The attem pt to establish God's relation to the w o rld and to b rid g e the gap between Him and m aterial, resu lted in Philo's d o c trin e of interm ediate beings, and p a rtic u la rly th a t of the Logos.
-120-
The voice told me th a t while God is indeed one, His highest and chiefest powers are tw o, even goodness and so ve re ig n ty. T hrough
His goodness He begat all th a t is, th ro u g h His sove reignty He rules w hat He has begotten. And in the m idst between the two there is a th ir d which unites them. Reason (th e Logos), fo r it is th ro u g h reason th a t God is both ru le r and good (P hilo, 1968:11:21) .
Because, according to Philo, God is transcendent and apart from the w o rld , an interm ediary power is re q u ire d . Such is the Logos which "comes to be d isting uish ed from God Himself, w ith o u t being ontologically disconnected from Him" (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971: XI11:413 ).
E vid en tly the Logos is id e n tifie d w ith the mind of God at times, is sometimes symbolized by the high p rie s t and at o th e r times is seen as being midway between man and God.
Guttman ( Logos corresponds to all three in being the u n ity of ideas, the simple source of cosmic power and the highest of the angels. Guttman (1973:28) ad ds:
T his combination o f Stoic, Platonic, and Jewish notions has resulted in a complicated m ixtu re rid d le d w ith co n tra d ictio n s. These con tra d ic tio n s concern the relatio nship o f these interm ediate beings to God. Sometimes the y are th o u g h t of as powers in h e re n t in God and sometimes as effects proceeding from him and th e ir mutual re lations to each o th e r; la s tly , it is hard to decide w hether they are personal o r impersonal beings.
T h ere fore, what one sees as God's a c tiv ity is really the a c tiv ity o f the Logos (c f. S ilv e r, 1974:213).
The problem w ith all of th is is th a t the Logos appears at times to be a second god. M oreover, if the Logos acts at God's command, then God must have some influence over it ; th e re fo re , God, the transcendent power, does s till act in his commanding. And if God cannot con tro l the -1 2 1 -Logos, then He is h a rd ly om nipotent.
It appears, th e re fo re , th a t the Logos adds as much confusion as c la rific a tio n to Philo's attem pt to es tab lish God's relation to the w o rld . In a d d itio n , it seems th a t Philo be lieves th a t it was not necessarily God b u t the Logos th a t created the w o rld .
.Creation
A ph ilo sop he r's th e o ry of creation is in e x tric a b ly in te rtw in e d w ith his
The question here is w hether the two philosophers being examined consider w hether the w orld was created ex n ih ilo o r ex n ih ilo n ih ilfit (from formless m a tte r). Philo is care fu l to remove the genesis of the w o rld beyond the confines of time (c f. Drummond, 1969:1:292) and states th a t it was created out of p re -e x is te n t m atter.
Time began e ith e r sim ultaneously w ith the w orld o r a fte r it . For since time is a measured space determ ined by the w o rld's movement, and since movement could not be p rio r to the object m oving, b u t must of necessity arise e ith e r a fte r it o r sim ultaneously w ith it, it follows of necessity tha t time also is e ith e r coeval w ith o r la te r born than the w orld (P hilo, 1971:1:21).
However, Winston (1981:7) points o u t a degree of confusion here as " it is exceedingly unclear w hether th a t m atter was its e lf, in Philo's view , a p ro d u ct of God's cre a tive a c t."
In co n tra st w ith Philo, Saadia considers th a t the w o rld was created ex n ih ilo in time. He propounds his view in the follow ing way:
I found th a t it is wrong to assume th a t th in g s were created from something already e xis te n t. Such a view is s e lf-c o n tra d ic to ry , because the term creation implies th a t the substance of the thin g is created and has a beginning in time, w h ils t the q u a lify in g statem ent, "From som ething" implies th a t its substance was ete rn al, uncreated and w ith o u t be ginning in time. If we assume th a t thin gs were created ex n ih ilo , there is no s e lf-c o n tra d ic tio n (T hree Jewish Philosophers, 1969:59-60).
-122-Saadia presents fo u r proofs fo r creation, the f ir s t founded on A ristote lia n premises and the o th e r three taken from the Kalam (c f. Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971:X IV : 550) . He f ir s t concludes th a t the force p re se rvin g the w orld is fin ite and as a re su lt the w orld its e lf must be fin ite , tha t is have a beginning and an end. Secondly, he argues th a t as an ythin g th a t consists of two o r more elements must have been p u t tog e th e r in This branch of the soul was not formed o f the same elements, out of which the o th e r branches were b ro u g h t to completion, b u t it was allotted something b e tte r and p u re r, the substance in fa ct out of which d iv in e natures were w ro u g h t.
And th e re fo re it is rea sonably held th a t the mind alone in all th a t makes us what we are is in d e s tru c tib le (P hilo, 1986:111:33) .
Man must make a fundamental choice concerning the d ire ctio n of his life .
The a lte rn a tiv e , according to the Encyclopaedia Judaica. This does not mean th a t Philo recommends flig h t from the w o rld ; he ra th e r looks upon the p ra ctical life as the p re re q u is ite fo r the contem plative one, even if the s p iritu a l alone has genuine value. He holds th a t man's life can reach fu lfilm e n t only in the life of the s p ir it as the material is subject to change and decay.
It is, th e n , of supreme im portance th a t men should be made aware of the perm anent re a lity of which the w orld is b u t a d is to rte d re fle x io n . This tru e re a lity is the mind o r w ill which is beyond all existence as its cause and p rin c ip le , the liv in g , self-conscious
Being who has made this universe and who now governs and guides it (B illin g s , 1979:13).
As a re su lt of th is concept, he maintains th a t the re is a stage beyond science and philosophy which is the highest achievement o f the mind:
wisdom.
For wisdom is a s tra ig h t high road, and it is when the mind's course is guided along tha t road th a t it reaches the goal which is the recognition of knowledge of God. Every comrade of the flesh hates and rejects th is path and seeks to c o rru p t it. For th e re are no two th in g s so u tte rly opposed as knowledge and pleasure o f the flesh (P hilo, 1968:111:81-83) . This is paralleled by his anthropology in which he lists th re e type s of man: e a rth -b o rn , heaven-born and G od-born.
The e a rth -b o rn are those who take the pleasures of the body fo r th e ir q u a rry , who make it th e ir p ra ctice to indulge in them and enjoy them and p ro vid e the means by which each of them may be promoted. The heaven-born are the votaries of the a rts and of knowledge, the lovers of le arn ing . For the heavenly element in us is the mind, as the heavenly beings are each of them a mind.
And it is the mind which pursues the learning of the schools and He describes the reconciliation between the soul and God in two ways:
God's descent in to the human soul and the soul's ascent to God:
In bo th, the in te rp la y of transcendence and immanence in the This concept is closer to the world of mysticism than to the ethical re li gion of Judaism, "in line w ith Philo's preference of immediate in tu itio n ove r and above the rational knowledge of God" (G uttm ann, 1973:30) .
Like Philo, Saadia sees man as a composite of body and soul, crcated to g e th e r:
O ur Lo rd, blessed and exalted be He, has informed us th a t man's soul has its o rig in in his heart sim ultaneously w ith the completion of the form ation of his body (Saadia, 1958:235) .
He views the soul as being composed of v e ry fin e material and having three essential fa cu ltie s: appetite, which controls grow th and re p ro d uctio n; s p ir it, o r courage, which controls the emotions; and reason, which controls knowledge. T h is, as Katz (1975:125) notes, is the famous tr ip a r tite Platonic account of man which Saadia took over from Islamic Platonism. It is because of this th a t the Hebrew language has three -125-d iffe re n t names fo r the soul: nefesh, ruah and neshamah, which re fe r re sp e ctive ly to the three faculties (c f. Saadia, 1948:244) .
Saadia m aintains th a t the soul cannot act on its own and, as a re s u lt, is placed in the body which serves as its in stru m e n t. He adds:
Now it is a mistake to apportion these (th re e ) faculties among two d is tin c t (p sych ic) elements, one of which has its seat in the heart w hile the o th e r is located in the rest of the body. A ll three powers belong ra th e r to one soul, to emphasize which fact the language of S c rip tu re has coined two additional designations, besides those pre v io u s ly liste d ; namely, hayyah (liv in g ) and yehidhad (u n iq u e ). -
126-
The notion o f fre p -w ill is a problem in both th e ir philosophies as if man is not free he cannot be held responsible fo r his actions; if he is free, then God cannot be omnipotent and possibly not omniscient e ith e r.
In The unchangeableness o f God, Philo contends th a t man is fre e , can make v o lu n ta ry choices, is able to know good from e v il, and can act ac c o rd in g ly . T here fore, he "is w ith reason blamed fo r what he does wrong w ith in te n t, praised when he acts r ig h tly of his own w ill" (Philo, 1968:111:33-35) . Paradoxically, however, Philo stresses th a t w ith o u t the help of God, man cannot do good by his own power; in the face of re ligious experience, he is impotent before God (c f. G uttmann, 1973:29) .
Saadia also appears to be unable to resolve th is question. In con tra st w ith the Islamic do ctrin e of pre de stinatio n, he asserts th a t man must have freedom of choice as he is responsible fo r his actions, and if he did not have th is freedom it would be un ju st fo r God to reward o r punish him (c f. Saadia, 1948:187) .
In attem pting to reconcile the paradox of free choice w ith God's foreknow ledge, Saadia says th a t God's knowledge does not cause man's actions and, th u s, does not cu rb his freedom of choice:
. . . let me say . . . th a t the C reator, m agnified be His m ajesty, does not in any way in te rfe re w ith the actions of men and th a t He does not exercise any force upon them e ith e r to obey o r disobey Him (Saadia, 1948:188) .
God sim ply knows what the re su lt of man's delib era tion w ill be and does not t r y to influence him. The question is, however: if God knows what man w ill do, is th is not in its e lf predestination and a co n tra d ictio n of Saadia's stated opinion?
.5 Knowledge
Philo describes various modes o f knowledge man can employ in ap proaching an unde rsta nd ing of God. The f ir s t is in te lle ctual knowledge which comes from na ture and tra in in g and is an emanation form the Logos; w ith th is knowledge, man can s triv e to lin k himself to God. Secondly, the re is em pirical knowledge which is ju s t a pre pa ration fo r the knowledge of God, having no value of its own. T h ird ly , as Philo uses science ex--127-clu sive ly fo r religious purposes, philosophic and religious knowledge become one. F urtherm ore, there is immediate in tu itio n w hich, having no s c ie n tific basis, is a repudiation of all theoretical knowledge. F ina lly, Philo lauds the mystical knowledge of God, c o n tra d ic tin g his e a rlie r praise of s c ie n tific e n q u iry (c f. G uttm an, 1973:30).
Not ad he ring to Philo's cla ssifica tio n , Saadia id en tifies three sources of knowledge: sense perception; se lf-e vid e n t p rin c ip le s , such as the ap pro val of te llin g the tru th and the condemnation of ly in g ; in fe re n tia l knowledge gained by s y llo g is tic reasoning -in o th e r w ords, rational conclusions from the data pro vid ed by sense and reason (c f. Saadia, 1948:16) . To these, however, he adds a fo u rth : th a t of a reliable tra d itio n , confidence in the tr u th of the reports o f o th e rs, which is es sential in the fu n c tio n in g o f society (c f. Saadia, 1948:19) . As the F.ncyclopaedia Judaica (1971:X IV :549) points ou t: "In Judaism reliable tra d itio n has special significance in th a t it refers to the transm ission, th ro u g h S c rip tu re and the oral tra d itio n , of God's revelation to the p ro p h e ts ."
It is th is concept of revelation to which both philosophers pay a degree of a tte n tio n .
Revelation
In his w ritin g s , Philo in sists th a t reason alone cannot guide man to an adequate and tru e knowledge of God. To achieve th is , "reason must be aided by reve la tion, by which Philo meant the record of Sinai as set down in the B ib le" (S ilv e r, 1974:211). It is, th e re fo re , evident th a t Philo is in accord w ith the Jewish concept of revelation in re g a rd in g the Torah as the absolute vehicle of God's tr u th ; revelation c la rifie s , in a way th a t reason cannot, aspects of God, creation and im m ortality.
It appears th a t Saadia goes more deeply in to th is question by m aintaining th a t although knowledge of the tr u th can be a rriv e d at th ro u g h specu la tio n , revelation is necessary in o rd e r to tra n sm it the tru th to those not able to in vestig ate ra tio n a lly ; fu rth e rm o re , even if one is able to consider ra tio n a lly , the do ctrine s contained in the Bible must not be ig nored. However, he adds the rid e r tha t the re is a correspondence be--128-tween reason and reve la tion, and onw cannot re fu te the o th e r.
As a re s u lt, "one must reject the v a lid ity of any pro ph et whose teachings co n tra d ict reason, even if he accompanies his teachings w ith m iracles" (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1971 :X IV :5 5 0 ). Saadis holds th a t revelation is necessary fo r man to gain knowledge o f the tra d itio n a l laws, and also fo r him to a rriv e at a knowledge o f rational laws, as reason deals only w ith ab stra ct prin cip le s and general norms.
Prophecy
Following from the concept of revelation is the one of prophecy, and once more Philo and Saadia are at variance in some respects while agreeing in oth ers.
In his treatise On the special laws, Philo propounds th a t "no pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own; he is an in te rp re te r prompted by A nother in all his utterances, 'A n o th e r' being the 'D ivine S p irit'" (P hilo, 1968; VI11:37 ) . This is in accord w ith Saadia's sixth p rin c ip le in th is Book of beliefs and opinions th a t a Jew must believe tha t the prophets were sent by God to communicate His message to men, God having appointed the prophets to call s in fu l man to repentance" (c f.
Cahn, 1962:332).
. . . I pondered the m atter deeply and I found th a t the re was con siderable need fo r the dispatch of messengers to God's cre a tu re s, not merely in o rd e r th a t they m ight be inform ed b y them about the revealed laws, b u t also on account of th e rational precepts. For these la tte r, too, are c a rrie d out p ra c tic a lly on ly when the re are messengers to in s tru c t men concerning them (Saadia, 1948:145) .
However, in his esoteric w ritin g s , Philo abandons th is concept of prophecy being a mission to the people:
Here prophecy is an act of ecstasy, where man is overflooded w ith In o rd e r to rid the anthropom orphic terms o r descriptions of th e ir tra d itio n a l meaning, Saadia f ir s t "n e u tra liz e s" them by showing -130-th a t they are applied in the Bible to man as well, where they also cannot be taken lite ra lly ; then he deduces a fo r tio r i the im p ossib ility of th e ir lite ra l application to God. ) summarizes Saadia's reasoning in saying:
If thus head related in the Bible sometimes to man expresses ele vatio n, eye su p e rvisio n , face pleasantness o r anger, ear acceptence, mouth and lip commanding, hand potence, heart w is dom, bowels a m iab ility, leg coercion -how much more these terms must convey all those no n-b odily meanings when related to God.
3.9 Reward and punishm ent, and im m ortality A nother concern of both philosophers is th a t of the odicy, and the y con sider why the evil prosper and the good s u ffe r. Philo insists th a t the judgements of men and God are not alike:
Tor we in q u ire into what is manifest b u t He penetrates noiselessly in to the recesses of the soul, sees o u r thoughts as though in b rig h t s u n lig h t, and s trip p in g o ff the w rappings in which they are en veloped, inspects o u r motives in th e ir naked re a lity and at once d isting uish es the co u n te rfe it from the genuine (P hilo, 1967:
IX :483).
He contends th a t God knows who have impious and ruthless souls and tre a ts them as capital offe n d e rs, stressin g th a t none of the wicked really has happiness, "and th is is a v e ry stro n g proof th a t providence e xists" (P hilo, 1967: t X :487) .
In sim ilar vein, Saadia fin d s the solution as ly in g in the balance between s u ffe rin g in th is w orld and being rewarded in the n e xt, in the world to come. T here fore, he believes in the im m ortality of the soul, and also in the re su rre ctio n of the dead (c f. Saadia, 1948:279) .
CONCLUSION
Philo and Saadia both agree and disagree concerning certain salient philosophical concepts. This is understandsble in the lig h t of the in -131-fluences on them.
A p a rt from the obvious Jewish background w ith its d e fin ite and, at times, unique approach where the y had much in common, the y moved in to ta lly d iffe re n t in te lle ctual spheres: Philo, w ith Hellenism predom inating, and Saadia w ith the M u'tazilites as sig n ifica n t.
Both see God as om niscient and om nipotent, b u t Philo's God, un like Saadia's, is not a personal one; his Logos fills the gap here. They d iffe r on the th e o ry o f crea tion , Philo stressin g th a t the w orld was created beyond the confines of time and out of p re -e x is te n t m atter, and Saadia asse rting th a t it was created ex n ih ilo in time.
Both consider man as a d u a lity of body and soul, and agree th a t the goal of the ethical life is to attain happiness, which is the highest good. They pay atten tion to knowledge, b u t cla ssify it d iffe re n tly , and Saadia's e x planation of revelation is e v id e n tly given deeper consideration than tha t of Philo. On the o th e r hand, Philo has a more complex view of prophecy in not always re g a rd in g it as a mission to the people. -132-
